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INTRODUCTION
Entrepreneurs and investors, along with employees, customers, and
others, have become increasingly interested in social enterprises. The
owners of these businesses pursue a dual objective of creating social goods
while also achieving profits.1 Several new legal forms of business
associations have evolved recently to attempt to address the challenges
that social enterprises face, with benefit corporations so far being the
leading new type.2 Most benefit corporations, and more generally social
enterprises to date, are new, small, and closely held businesses. They do
not enjoy the benefits or face the challenges of having publicly traded
shares and large numbers of shareholders.

*
Professor and Dorsey & Whitney Chair in Law, University of Minnesota Law School. I thank
participants at the Berle VIII Symposium at the Seattle University School of Law for helpful
comments.
1. See generally Robert A. Katz & Antony Page, The Role of Social Enterprise, 35 VT. L. REV.
59 (2010); Heerad Sabeti, The For-Benefit Enterprise, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov. 2011, at 98.
2. See generally Dana Brakman Reiser, Theorizing Forms for Social Enterprise, 62 EMORY L.J.
681 (2013); Joseph Yockey, Does Social Enterprise Law Matter?, 66 ALA. L. REV. 767 (2015).
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But there are a few publicly traded social enterprises,3 and if social
enterprises are to succeed on a large scale, some day there will need to be
many more. Publicly traded benefit corporations will face unique
challenges that do not exist, in the same form, for either ordinary publicly
traded corporations or for closely held benefit corporations. In particular,
balancing accountability of the managers of the business with a firm,
ongoing commitment to both corporate objectives—doing good and
making money—may prove extremely difficult.4 How might publicly
traded benefit corporations address these challenges? What sorts of
supporting institutions and practices might develop to help? Might stock
markets play an important role?
This Article explores those questions. Part I begins by considering
the leading benefits and costs for a benefit corporation that chooses to go
public.5 It starts there both to begin gaining an understanding of the
challenges public companies will face and also to consider whether going
public is likely to actually be an attractive option at all for some set of
social enterprises. Some of the benefits and costs of going public are the
same for benefit corporations as for ordinary corporations—access to new
sources of capital and new accountability mechanisms are benefits, but
legal compliance and pressures from shareholders to show quick results
are costs. But, there are also special benefits and costs for benefit
corporations, or the benefits and costs that other companies face may play
out differently for social enterprises. On the benefit side, access to new
sources of capital may be even more important for social enterprises,
which may find it harder to attract investors given the commitment to
doing good. Additionally, founders and early investors may use publicly
traded stock as a way of achieving a profitable exit from their investment,
though this benefit may be less important to investors in social enterprises
whose desire for profit may be tempered by the desire to do good as well.
Going public also shifts control from the founders and early investors to
the board of directors, which could possibly allow for more commitment
to the social mission of the business. But, the shift in control may pose a
risk to the social mission. Public shareholders, especially shareholder
activists, may create pressures to pursue profit at the expense of the social
mission.
Part II considers early experiments in publicly traded social
enterprises, or at least arrangements that come close to being such.6 It
3. See discussion of Etsy and Laureate Education, infra notes 58–70 and accompanying text.
4. See generally Brett H. McDonnell, Committing to Doing Good and Doing Well: Fiduciary
Duty in Benefit Corporations, 20 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 19 (2014).
5. See infra notes 15–27 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 34–83 and accompanying text.
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surveys various public exchanges such as the Social Stock Exchange in
the UK,7 the Social Venture Connection in Canada,8 and the Impact
Exchange in Singapore and Mauritius.9 It also surveys early experiments
in crowdfunding of social enterprises, online sites for impact investing by
accredited investors, and a few individual corporations, including Laureate
Education, a Delaware public benefit corporation, which (as of the time of
writing) has filed an S-1 registration statement10 in preparation to go
public, and Etsy, a B Lab-certified public corporation. Finally, Part II
ponders various lessons to be learned from these early experiments.
Part III moves to consider various mechanisms by which benefit
corporations, investors, stock markets, and other gatekeepers might be
able to realize the benefits of going public while minimizing the costs.11
Disclosure of actions taken to advance a firm’s social mission can give
incentives to behave well, to maintain a good reputation, and to provide
information to investors that could affect their choice of which firms to
invest in. The revised fiduciary duty of benefit corporations may also help
ensure that they pursue their dual missions, with a greater chance of suits
being brought in public companies with thousands of shareholders
(potential plaintiffs) if the corporation fails to pursue their dual mission.
Board representation rules and processes could give various stakeholder
groups other than shareholders a say in decision making. Relatedly,
various stakeholder groups could be given several possible kinds of voting
rights. Dual-class share structures may help ensure that control remains
with shareholders committed to the social mission. Time-phased or tenure
voting may give more power to shareholders with long-term interests in
the company. And, investor screening devices may help keep investors
that are not committed to a company’s mission from investing in that
company. Finally, a variety of gatekeepers could help ensure
accountability and fidelity to the corporate mission. Possible gatekeepers
include certifiers like B Lab, auditors, insurers, lawyers, and exchanges
themselves.
Finally, Part IV focuses on the specific role of stock exchanges and
similar institutions as ways to help facilitate the various governance and
shareholding mechanisms discussed in Part III.12 Exchanges, through their
7. SOCIAL STOCK EXCHANGE, http://socialstockexchange.com/ [https://perma.cc/YZ5M-RKJR].
8. SOCIAL VENTURE CONNECTION, https://svx.ca/en [https://perma.cc/7VH9-Z3N3] [hereinafter
SVX].
9. IMPACT EXCHANGE, http://impactexchange.asiaiix.com/ [https://perma.cc/5V2F-3EDY].
10. When a company “goes public” it must file a registration statement with the SEC, containing
quite an extensive disclosure. The registration statement which companies going public typically use
is Form S-1.
11. See infra notes 85–132 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 17–26 and accompanying text.
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listing requirements, could require or encourage the mechanisms
discussed in Part III. If different exchanges create different requirements,
they would allow experimentation as to what works and what doesn’t,
reducing the challenges that publicly traded benefit corporations will face.
Exchange listing could also work as a branding device for companies.
Exchanges could provide a focus for the involvement of various corporate
gatekeepers, helping to coordinate expectations and best practices for how
social enterprises should govern themselves to best pursue their dual
missions.
I. BENEFITS AND COSTS OF GOING PUBLIC
Social enterprises, as I use the term here, are businesses that are
committed to both generating economic returns for their investors while
also pursuing one more social missions.13 The benefit corporation is a new
legal form created to respond to the perceived needs of social enterprises.
Benefit corporations are business corporations, governed by the standard
rules of corporation law except for a few characteristics: their corporate
purpose includes pursuing a social mission; their fiduciary duties require
directors and officers to consider the effect of decisions on stakeholders
other than shareholders; and, they must regularly report on what they have
done to pursue their social missions.14 In this Article, I am mostly
concerned with the practical and legal issues surrounding benefit
corporations that become publicly traded, but much of the discussion of
those issues applies to social enterprises more broadly.
We start by exploring the benefits and costs to a benefit corporation
of having publicly traded shares. This makes sense as a starting point for
(at least) two reasons. First, a core premise of this Article is that if benefit
corporations (and social enterprises more generally) are to succeed and
become a significant part of the economy, some of the most successful
companies will want, and need, to go public. Exploring the benefits and
costs of going public will help us understand why that may be so and hence
why we need to examine measures to help public markets adapt to the
needs of benefit corporations. But it is also worth keeping in mind that the
premise may be false; that is, even if benefit corporations become a
significant part of the economy, they may rarely—if ever—benefit from
13. See generally sources cited supra note 1.
14. For an overview of benefit corporations, see generally WILLIAM H. CLARK, JR. ET AL., WHITE
PAPER: THE NEED AND RATIONALE FOR THE BENEFIT CORPORATION: WHY IT IS THE LEGAL FORM
THAT BEST ADDRESSES THE NEEDS OF SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURS, INVESTORS, AND, ULTIMATELY, THE
PUBLIC (Jan. 13, 2013), http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/Benefit_Corporation_White_
Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/XV3P-WR3H]; CORP. LAWS COMM., ABA BUS. L. SECTION, BENEFIT
CORPORATION WHITE PAPER, 68 BUS. LAW. 1083 (2013).
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going public. In that case, this Article can be taken as a cautionary tale of
the problems involved for benefit corporations that go public.
A second reason for starting with an overview of the benefits and
costs of going public focuses in particular on the costs. There are certainly
challenges facing any social enterprise that chooses to go public. The
remaining sections of this Article explore various means by which
companies, investors, and markets can try to address and reduce the
relevant costs. Therefore, one must then start with an overview of the most
important costs.
Let us start with the benefits of going public. Public stock (and bond)
markets can provide a significant source of capital for businesses. That
point can be overstated—for years, U.S. stock markets have seen a net
outflow of funds as dividends and share repurchases exceed the amount of
new money invested through share issues.15 Still, a company listed on a
stock exchange has an important way of raising money available to it that
other companies lack. This benefit is obviously not unique for benefit
corporations—it is a major reason why any company chooses to go public.
However, raising money could conceivably be an even bigger
consideration for social enterprises than more conventional companies,
because social enterprises can find it particularly hard to raise capital due
to their dual missions.16 Because they may choose to prioritize their social
mission over profits if the two conflict, investors may fear that social
enterprises will earn lower returns, lowering the return on their
investments. Thus, social enterprises may need to explore a wider range
of potential investors, and public markets could be one option that helps
meet their needs. Of course, as I shall soon discuss,17 one may suspect that
investors in publicly traded companies are even more profit-centered than
other investors, making them a poor fit for social enterprises. However,
perhaps there are some contexts and some pools of potential investors that
are more favorable. In Part II, I will discuss crowdfunding as one sort of
public or quasi-public fundraising that may be particularly attractive to
benefit corporations because already popular forms of nonequity
crowdfunding are associated with public good-oriented giving.18
15. Bob Bryan, The Biggest Force Powering the Stock Market is Starting to Disappear, and It
Could Be a Huge Problem, BUS. INSIDER (Mar. 12, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/buybacksdisappearing-could-mean-recession-2016-3 [https://perma.cc/9CFH-YLYU].
16. See generally Susan N. Gary, Is It Prudent to Be Responsible? The Legal Rules for Charities
That Engage in Socially Responsible Investing and Mission Investing, 6 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 106
(2011); Paul Brest & Kelly Born, When Can Impact Investment Create Real Impact?, STAN. SOC.
INNOVATION REV. (2013); Antony Bugg-Levine et al., A New Approach to Funding Social
Enterprises, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 2012, at 118.
17. See infra notes 30–33 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 77–83 and accompanying text.
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Another benefit of going public is that it provides a potentially
lucrative way for company founders and early investors to exit with big
gains on their investments. This is another benefit that is shared with other
types of corporations.19 However, it would seem to be a weaker benefit for
benefit corporations than for traditional profit-oriented companies. After
all, the founders and investors of benefit corporations will presumably care
somewhat less about profit and somewhat more about doing good than the
founders and investors of other businesses and so the prospect of a big
payout after going public will be less important to them. But less important
does not mean totally unimportant; founders and investors of benefit
corporations do seek profit (or else they could form as nonprofits and gain
tax advantages), so the big payout on going public will matter at least
somewhat in some cases.
A final potential benefit of going public is that it typically shifts
effective control from the main shareholders (usually the founders and
early investors) to the directors and officers of the corporation.20 There are
problems associated with this—the separation of ownership and control
and its result agency costs are, after all, the leading concern of American
corporate law and governance.21 But especially in the context of benefit
corporations, there is an important potential benefit. When push comes to
shove, shareholders—even shareholders who have chosen to invest in a
benefit corporation—may push to prioritize profits over social mission. In
a closely held corporation, the board will generally be tied to and
controlled by a controlling shareholder or group of shareholders.22 In a
public corporation with enough of a dispersed ownership structure, the
directors and officers will be less directly subject to effective shareholder
control.23 That may allow them to pursue their own interests, but it also
allows them to pursue the interests of other stakeholders and specified
public goods. Such is the model of the board as mediating hierarch in the
theory of Blair and Stout24 and, if it ever applies, it applies better in public
than in closely held corporations.

19. Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital Markets:
Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 243, 257–64 (1998).
20. A common, though not universal, feature of U.S. public corporations is that they have no
shareholder who owns a high enough percentage of shares to effectively control the business. See
Rafael La Porta et al., Corporate Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471, 471 (1999).
21. A point first brought to sustained attention in ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE
MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
22. See Cynthia S. Grandfield, The Reasonable Expectations of Minority Shareholders in Closely
Held Corporations: The Morality of Small Businesses, 14 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 381, 382–83 (2002).
23. See generally BERLE & MEANS, supra note 21.
24. See generally Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate
Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999).
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Of course, there are problems with this change in governance
structure, which leads us to the costs of going public. One cost for all types
of public companies is various compliance costs that come with being
public. These have increased in recent years with various provisions of the
Sarbanes-Oxley25 and Dodd-Frank26 Acts. Some blame the decline in
companies going public on these increased costs,27 although that claim is
disputed.28 This cost is not unique to benefit corporations, though insofar
as one contemplates additional rules for benefit corporations (e.g.,
additional disclosure rules) the costs could be higher for them.
More fundamentally, the change in ownership and governance
structure has perils as well as promise. One of these is traditional for any
type of public corporation: the separation of ownership and control may
make it easier for managers to make decisions that benefit themselves at
the expense of shareholders and other stakeholders.29
Another problem with the change in ownership structure is that the
business loses control over who its shareholders are. This loss of control
opens up companies to the possibility of a hostile takeover and, more
relevantly, opens them up to the rising number of activist shareholders.30
Even for ordinary corporations, shareholder activism has led to concern
that managers are becoming more short-term in their focus as a way of
heading off unwanted shareholder activism.31 There is much debate over
whether this is true, and even if it is, whether that is a bad thing. I have
argued elsewhere that the evidence is quite murky, but it does seem
plausible that there is at least a somewhat significant problem.32
25. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745.
26. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-203,
124 Stat. 1376.
27. COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REG., INTERIM REPORT x–xi (2006), http://capmktsreg.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/08/Committees-November-2006-Interim-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/657XKKE4]; COMM’N ON THE REG. OF U.S. CAPITAL MKTS. IN THE 21ST CENTURY, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 6 (2007), http://www.centerforcapitalmarkets.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/
06/Commission-on-the-regulation-of-us-cap-markets-report-and-recommendations.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z6SN-DALV].
28. See generally Robert Prentice, Sarbanes-Oxley: The Evidence Regarding the Impact of SOX
404, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 703 (2007).
29. See generally Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); BERLE & MEANS, supra
note 21.
30. Activist shareholders buy significant shares in a corporation and then pressure the
management of that corporation to make organizational or operational changes that they believe will
increase the share price. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The
Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 545 (2016).
31. See generally Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Short- and Long-Term Investors (and
Other Stakeholders Too): Must (and Do) Their Interests Conflict?, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 396 (Claire A. Hill & Steven Davidoff Solomon eds., 2016).
32. Id.
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This short-termism problem is worse for benefit corporations. The
shareholder activists seek profits, not doing good. Moreover, insofar as
doing good has reputational benefits that increase profits in the long run,
pressure to increase profits in the short term may make companies less
sensitive to those benefits.33 Thus, the pressure of effective shareholder
activism raises a major concern that benefit corporations that go public
will face mission drift and, over time, come to prioritize profits over social
benefits, thereby challenging their core defining feature and purpose.
Do the benefits of going public outweigh the costs for benefit
corporations? That is hard to answer in the abstract, and it may well differ
for different companies. Indeed, for most benefit corporations the costs
will continue to outweigh the benefits as is the case for most businesses of
all sorts. The more precise question is whether a significant number of
successful benefit corporations will find the benefits of going public
outweigh the costs.
One should not quickly jump to conclude that the answer is yes. The
costs are real and the benefits are uncertain, and maybe benefit
corporations should and will remain limited to closely held entities. But
the answer may depend in part upon what can be done to control the costs
identified above. The rest of this Article is devoted to exploring
mechanisms that may control the costs. For those skeptical about whether
public benefit corporations will ever make sense, consider this an
exploration of the difficulty of reducing the costs of going public. For
those more optimistic about the prospects of public benefit corporations,
the following parts will explore possible practices that could develop to
help support those corporations.
As one considers the leading unique benefits and costs of going
public for benefit corporations, one sees that they must strike a difficult
balance between maintaining the accountability of officers and directors
(and thus avoiding self-dealing); reducing pressures to follow the dictates
of profit-focused activist shareholders (and thus avoiding mission drift);
while overall leaving managers the discretion to make difficult choices
while still credibly committing to achieve both profits and social good.
II. EARLY EXPERIMENTS
Rather than speculate in a vacuum about how benefit corporations
should handle the challenges of becoming publicly traded, let us start by
looking at early experiments that may shed light on what might work. As
of this writing, there is no company organized legally as a benefit
corporation that has shares listed on a public stock exchange, much less
33. Id.
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any stock exchange that particularly focuses on listing benefit
corporations. However, there are various exchanges and online portals that
are in the neighborhood of being such exchanges as well as individual
companies that are close to being publicly traded benefit corporations. To
consider the experiences of some of these institutions is a useful first step.
Sarah Dadush’s Regulating Social Finance 34 is a valuable article that
reviews three early experiments in public exchanges for social enterprises
that were all formed in 2013. One of those public exchange experiments
is the Social Stock Exchange (SSX) based in the United Kingdom.35 At
the time of Dadush’s article, the SSX was simply an online information
portal for social enterprises that were already listed on a traditional
exchange.36 The idea of the portal is to inform interested investors about
these companies so that they can then buy their shares if they are suitably
impressed. The SSX has now partnered with the ICAP Securities and
Derivatives Exchange (ISDX) to create a market-trading segment on
ISDX for SSX member companies.37
To join the SSX (and thereby gain access to investors in the ISDX),
companies must be approved by an Admissions Panel and prepare an
Impact Report. The Impact Report both provides the core information on
which an admissions decision is based, and provides disclosure to
investors and the general public about what social goals a company is
pursuing, and what it does to pursue those goals. The Impact Report is
prepared with the assistance of an independent analyst and must be
updated annually.38 As Dadush emphasizes, the guidance as to what
Impact Reports must contain is broad, and hence Reports vary
considerably.39 Listed companies are not required to report any specific
quantitative metrics. There is also little to nothing in the way of
governance standards that companies must follow.40 Also, as Dadush
rather critically emphasizes, SSX does nothing to explicitly screen
investors in SSX-listed companies (indeed, investors purchase on a
different platform, ISDX or some other traditional exchange, not through
SSX itself).41

34. Sarah Dadush, Regulating Social Finance: Can Social Stock Exchanges Meet the
Challenge?, 37 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 139 (2015).
35. SOCIAL STOCK EXCHANGE, http://socialstockexchange.com/ [https://perma.cc/YZ5MRKJR].
36. Dadush, supra note 34, at 193.
37. Our Markets, ISDX, http://www.isdx.com/about-us/our-markets/ [https://perma.cc/N5MHTXTU].
38. Dadush, supra note 34, at 195–97.
39. Id. at 194–97.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 198.
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The second institution Dadush examines is the Social Venture
Connection (SVX) in Canada.42 SVX is a platform for accredited investors
to find and connect with social enterprises that list share offerings on it.
Thus, SVX is not a full-fledged exchange because buyers are limited to
accredited investors and because it is a platform for initial offerings by
companies to investors, not for reselling shares on a secondary market. In
order to be listed on SVX, issuers must either self-report a score of at least
100 on the Global Impact Investing Rating System (GIIRS) or get B Lab
certified (which requires a GIIRS rating of at least 80, audited by B Lab).43
Once listed, these scores must be regularly updated.44 Therefore, in
contrast with the broad qualitative standards of the SSX Impact Reports,
SVX relies on the detailed quantitative metrics embodied in the GIIRS
ratings.
SVX also makes an effort to screen its investors. The Investors
Agreement contains the following warning:
Investing in issuers whose offerings are posted on the SVX online
platform has significant risk. The main objective of these issuers is
not to maximize returns to the investors and you should invest in
issuers whose offerings are posted on the SVX online platform only
if you are prepared not to receive any return on your investment and
to lose your investment in its entirety.45

The Investors Manual states that its investors are “[i]mpact-first
investors with a focus on achieving positive social and/or environmental
outcomes with patient capital investments.”46 SVX retains the right to
terminate investor access to the platform. Dadush approvingly notes these
efforts to screen out impatient investors who are not focused on social
impact—SVX is the only one of the three exchanges she examines that
does so.47
Dadush’s third subject is the Impact Exchange (IX), a joint project
of the Stock Exchange of Mauritius and the Impact Investment Exchange
Asia, based in Singapore.48 IX aims to be a full-fledged public exchange
for social enterprises, with secondary trading occurring on its platform and

42. SVX, supra note 8.
43. SVX, SVX ISSUER MANUAL, 15, http://s3.amazonaws.com/svx.staging/comfy/cms/files/
files/000/000/173/SVX_Issuer_Manual-original.pdf [https://perma.cc/B5QE-EZB4].
44. Id.
45. SVX, SVX INVESTOR MANUAL 19, http://s3.amazonaws.com/svx.staging/comfy/cms/
files/files/000/000/178/SVX_Investor_Manual-original.pdf [https://perma.cc/BDH9-KZ9Z].
46. Id. at 13.
47. Dadush, supra note 34, at 205–06.
48. IMPACT EXCHANGE, http://impactexchange.asiaiix.com/ [https://perma.cc/5V2F-3EDY].
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not limited to accredited investors. So far, no companies are listed, only a
few impact bonds.49
For a company to be listed on IX, it must meet a variety of
requirements. It must specifically state that a positive social or
environmental impact is “its primary reason for existence.”50 It must
commit to “ongoing monitoring and evaluation of impact performance
using clearly defined impact indicators for performance assessment and
reporting.”51 It must prepare annual reports on its social impact “in
accordance with Impact Exchange reporting principles”52 (These
principles are not clearly spelled out, at least not in publicly available
documents.). And, it must have been certified by an independent social or
environmental ratings body.53 To help ensure applicant companies
adequately comply with these standards, applicants are assigned an
Authorized Impact Representative to help them complete the process.54
There appear to be no restrictions on who can invest and less attempt to
weed out unwelcome investors than at the SVX.
Beyond these three examples analyzed by Dadush, a variety of other
institutions exist, at least within the neighborhood of being public
exchanges for social enterprises. Many of these institutions are online
investing platforms for accredited investors focused on impact
investments (indeed, SVX is an example). Another example is Mission
Markets (MMX).55 Investments offered on MMX include “funds, project
finance, structured debt products and later stage private and public
companies in addition to earlier stage offerings that we may, from
time-to-time, also list.”56 Investors are mostly limited to accredited
investors—there does not appear to be an explicit attempt to weed out
nonimpact investors. All listed entities must include their performance
under an approved third-party sustainability metric, such as GIIRS. They
also require an Impact Reporting and Investment Standards (IRIS)
indicated result metric.57
The experience of some individual companies, rather than exchanges
or portals, also may yield some insight. As of now, there is not a single
49. These are pooled investments of bonds issued to various enterprises.
50.
IMPACT
EXCH.,
IMPACT
EXCHANGE
BOARD
LISTING
GUIDE
10,
http://impactexchange.asiaiix.com/wpcontent/uploads/2014/03/Impact_Exchange_Listing_Guide_Fe
b2014_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/N7UX-Q2NF].
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 14–15.
55. MISSION MARKETS, http://www.missionmarkets.com/ [https://perma.cc/B4UY-B3SV].
56. Frequently Asked Questions, MISSION MARKETS, http://www.missionmarkets.com/
#!faq/c1r2k [https://perma.cc/H7TX-4M9D].
57. Id.
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company legally organized as a benefit corporation that is publicly traded.
However, there are some close calls. Laureate Education is a Delaware
public benefit corporation that has filed an S-1 registration statement in
preparation for going public; although, it has not yet completed its Initial
Public Offering (IPO).58 Laureate is a leading for-profit provider of higher
education with its business mostly concentrated in Latin America.59
For-profit higher education is a controversial field with concerns that such
providers make profits at the expense of quality, often relying on
government-subsidized student loans.60 Benefit corporation status may be
a way for Laureate to try to commit to maintaining a focus on its public
educational mission despite its for-profit status. As such, the difficulty of
maintaining such a dual commitment is a major question mark surrounding
Laureate, and the effectiveness of its mechanisms for avoiding mission
drift is a significant question for the company.
Laureate uses dual-class stock to allow founders and early investors
to maintain control over the business while bringing in more equity
investors.61 We will discuss dual-class stock more below.62 Suffice to say,
it is controversial, and many academic commentators have complained
that dual-class stock splits control from a financial stake in a company’s
success.63 Still, it could be an effective way to prevent mission drift driven
by shareholder activism in social enterprises. Laureate also has a high debt
level.64 This could create a potential incentive to take on too much risk,
but for a social enterprise, it may also be a way to gain additional financing
without issuing shares that could relinquish control to shareholders who
lack adequate commitment to the mission. Laureate states that it plans to
become a B Lab certified corporation,65 adding B Lab as an outside
certifier of Laureate’s commitment to pursuing the public good.
Another notable company is Etsy. Etsy is a B Lab certified company
that went public in 2015.66 It is not a benefit corporation, but under B Lab’s
current rules, it will eventually need to become one if it wishes to remain
58. Laureate Education, Inc., Registration Statement Under the Securities Act of 1933 (Form
S-1) (Oct. 2, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/912766/000104746915007679/
a2209311zs-1.htm [https://perma.cc/9N8K-M46N] [hereinafter Laureate S-1].
59. Id. at 1–3.
60. See generally Amanda Harmon Cooley & Aaron Cooley, From Diploma Mills to For-Profit
Colleges and Universities: Business Opportunities, Regulatory Challenges, and Consumer
Responsibility in Higher Education, 18 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 505 (2009).
61. Laureate S-1, supra note 58, at 68–69.
62. See infra notes 113–116 and accompanying text.
63. See, e.g., Paul Gompers et al., Incentives vs. Control: an Analysis of U.S. Dual-Class
Companies (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10240, 2004),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w10240.pdf [https://perma.cc/3G63-64K4].
64. Laureate S-1, supra note 58, at 61–62.
65. Id. at 64.
66. Mission & Values, ETSY, https://www.etsy.com/mission [https://perma.cc/GX3N-PGPJ].
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certified. Etsy is an eBay-like online craft market. Its brand revolves
around a focus on independent artisanship, explaining its desire to identify
as a social enterprise.67 Since going public, its performance raises some
questions about both sides of the dual mission. On the for-profit side of
the ledger, Etsy’s stock price since going public has dropped
precipitously,68 even more than the large drop that is typical for newly
public companies.69 On the social mission side of the ledger, Etsy has
generated significant controversy when it transferred much of its
intellectual property to an Irish subsidiary because of Ireland’s status as a
tax haven.70 The use of Ireland and other jurisdictions to avoid U.S. taxes
has been a major political controversy for some time, and Etsy’s action
has raised awkward questions about whether a commitment to doing good
is consistent with aggressive techniques to avoid paying taxes.71
More loosely related to our topic, many significant public companies
are like Laureate in that they use dual-class stock.72 These are not benefit
corporations or B Lab certified, but might some of them qualify more
informally as social enterprises? As noted above in discussing Laureate,
though dual-class stock creates serious concerns, it can potentially be
justified as a way to retain control in the hands of early shareholders
strongly committed to the dual mission while still bringing in new public
shareholders who provide additional equity.73 There are at least two
distinct classes of public companies using dual-class stock. The first class
is media companies, including the New York Times and the Washington
Post.74 Their use of dual class stock is justified on a quite plausible social
enterprise-like ground. Newspapers, after all, do profess to advance the
public good by providing reporting and information that is essential to
deliberative decision making in a democracy. Serious investigative
67. Id.
68. Greg DePersio, Etsy: How It’s Fared Since Its 2015 IPO (ETSY), INVESTOPEDIA (Jan. 27,
2016),
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/markets/012716/etsy-how-its-fared-its-2015-ipoetsy.asp [https://perma.cc/Q5PT-AG5J].
69. Roger G. Ibbotson et al., The Market’s Problems With the Pricing of Initial Public Offerings,
7 J. APP. CORP. FIN. 66, 73–74 (1994).
70. Alex Barinka & Jesse Drucker, Etsy Taps Secret Irish Tax Haven and Brags About
Transparency at Home, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 13, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2015-08-14/etsy-taps-secret-irish-tax-haven-and-touts-transparency-at-home [https://perma.cc/582Q5MBD].
71. Rob Davies & Dominic Rush, Pfizer Takeover: What Is a Tax Inversion Deal and Why Are
They So Controversial?, GUARDIAN (Nov. 23, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/
business/2015/nov/23/pfizer-takeover-tax-inversion-questions [https://perma.cc/RKY7-T6R7].
72. Gompers et al., supra note 63 and accompanying text.
73. Id.
74. Gregory Zuckerman & Chris Reiter, New York Times Faces Share-Class Challenge, WALL
ST. J. (Apr. 19, 2006 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB114540837862029468
[https://perma.cc/4PJT-U365].
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reporting can be quite expensive with an uncertain payoff, so a pure
for-profit company may not invest as much money in such reporting as a
social enterprise with a dual mission. The second prominent class of public
companies with dual-class stock consists of high tech companies, most
famously Google and Facebook.75 Can these plausibly be portrayed as
social enterprises? Google does, after all, proclaim a motto of “[d]on’t be
evil,”76 but one can perhaps be excused for having some skepticism on this
point.
A final emerging example of something resembling a public market
for benefit corporations is the new field of equity crowdfunding.77
Crowdfunding for pure donations, or in return for rewards, has been
around for some time and has become a significant source of financing for
many small businesses. However, equity crowdfunding (going online to
raise money in return for issuing equity interests) has, until recently, been
essentially impossible under federal securities law. Congress attempted to
change this with the CROWDFUND Act, part of the JOBS Act passed in
2012.78 However, the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) rules
needed to implement the crowdfunding provisions did not take effect until
May 2016.79 So, there is still little data for equity crowdfunding.
It seems plausible that crowdfunding may become a major source of
funding for benefit corporations.80 Indeed, it may be the most probable
route by which benefit corporations will become a major part of the
economy. Older and quite successful forms of crowdfunding are focused
on enterprises that seem socially attractive, and crowdfunding is attractive
to younger generations raised online.81 Additionally, this demographic
also seems more likely to be interested in social enterprise.82 Very early
75. Matt Orsagh, Dual-Class Shares: From Google to Alibaba, Is It a Troubling Trend for
Investors?, CFA INST. (Apr. 1, 2014), https://blogs.cfainstitute.org/marketintegrity/2014/04/01/dualclass-shares-from-google-to-alibaba-is-it-a-troubling-trend-for-investors/
[https://perma.cc/44C4JQ32].
76. Or at least it did—now it proclaims “do the right thing.” Alistair Barr, Google’s “Don’t Be
Evil” Becomes Alphabet’s “Do the Right Thing,” WALL ST. J.: DIGITS (Oct. 2, 2015),
http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2015/10/02/as-google-becomes-alphabet-dont-be-evil-vanishes/
[https://perma.cc/X4EU-LEE4].
77. See, e.g., Laura A Farley, Knowledge Is Power: How Implementing Affirmative Disclosures
Under the JOBS Act Could Promote and Protect Benefit Corporations and Their Investors, 99 MINN.
L. REV. 1507 (2015); Joan McLeod Heminway, To Be or Not to Be (A Security): Funding For-Profit
Social Enterprises, 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 299 (2013); Christine Hurt, Pricing Disintermediation:
Crowdfunding and Online Auction IPOs, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 217 .
78. Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306, §§ 301–305 (2012).
79. Regulation Crowdfunding: A Small Entity Compliance Guide for Issuers, SEC (May 13,
2016), https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/secg/rccomplianceguide-051316.htm [https://perma.cc/
M8C8-25NH].
80. Hurt, supra note 77, at 258–60.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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evidence suggests there may indeed be a connection between equity
crowdfunding and social enterprises. DrinkerBiddle collected data on the
first fifty company filings under the new crowdfunding regulations. Seven
of these filings were by benefit corporations, benefit LLCs, or B Lab
certified companies. That is 14% of the filings—quite disproportionately
high given the still tiny number of benefit corporations relative to all new
businesses in the country.83
Thus, though there is not yet a true public exchange devoted to
benefit corporations, or social enterprises more generally, there are a
variety of institutions and individual companies that are providing early
experiments in how an ecosystem for publicly traded benefit corporations
might evolve. Disclosure is an important element across most of these
experiments; although, standards are still in flux and emerging. There has
not been a lot of focus on governance mechanisms at the exchange level,
but individual companies are experimenting with at least one such
mechanism: dual-class stock. Exchanges and companies seem to be
focusing on attracting a new type of impact investor interested in a dual
mission of profit and social good. However, not a lot has been done yet in
finding ways to keep out investors who may focus too much on short-term
profits at the expense of social mission. We explore these issues and
mechanisms more in Part III.
III. GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS
The challenges facing benefit corporations, and social enterprises
generally, are different from those facing other companies but not radically
new. The various corporate governance mechanisms used for traditional
for-profits are also available to benefit corporations and starting to be used
by them. We can see many of them at work in the early experiments
discussed in Part II. Part III will be a discussion of the most significant
types of corporate governance mechanisms, and how they are already
being adapted to benefit corporations and potentially could be further
adapted.
Disclosure is a central element in the experiments described above,
which should come as no surprise. Disclosure is of course the central
strategy of U.S. securities law and the leading way in which we regulate
public companies.84 Disclosure is also a central element in the new state
83. Marc A. Leaf et al., Leading the Crowd: An Analysis of the First 50 Crowdfunding Offerings,
DRINKER BIDDLE (July 14, 2016), http://www.drinkerbiddle.com/insights/publications/
2016/07/leading-the-crowd-first-50-crowdfunding-offerings?noredirect=true
[https://perma.cc/
6BFL-Q852].
84. In the SEC’s own words, “The laws and rules that govern the securities industry in the United
States derive from a simple and straightforward concept: all investors, whether large institutions or
private individuals, should have access to certain basic facts about an investment prior to buying it,
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laws creating benefit corporations. Those statutes have two main elements
that distinguish benefit corporations from others. One is the new fiduciary
duties (discussed next in our list of governance mechanisms).85 The other
is regular benefit reports, which benefit corporations must produce and
give or make available to their shareholders.86 Most of the statutes (though
notably not Delaware) require that companies use an independent,
third-party standard with which to measure themselves in these reports;
although, they do not require using third-party auditors to certify the
accuracy of their reporting.87
The exchanges discussed in Part II feature disclosure as their shared
central regulatory strategy. They handle their disclosure requirements in
differing ways. The SSX Social Impact Report rules set out a vague set of
qualitative standards.88 By contrast, SVX requires use of the detailed
quantitative rules of the GIIRS rating system.89 Third-party auditing is not
required by SVX, but B Lab certification is encouraged insofar as a
company can be listed with a lower rating if it is B Lab certified as opposed
to self-reporting.90 The IX reporting standards are not yet clear (at least not
in public), but they do require use of an outside Authorized Impact
Representative to ensure compliance.91 MMX requires use of a third-party
quantitative metric, such as GIIRS.92
Going forward, there are a variety of issues and options for benefit
corporations and social enterprises. For example, do we need more
uniformity in reporting by benefit corporations? Uniformity helps make
comparisons across companies easier—a leading justification for
securities regulation.93 On the other hand, as the social missions of benefit
corporations may vary wildly, information that matters to investors may
vary correspondingly. Moreover, at this stage, social impact measures are
still evolving, and companies and investors are still learning what
and so long as they hold it. To achieve this, the SEC requires public companies to disclose meaningful
financial and other information to the public.” What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION
(June 10, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml [https://perma.cc/R6Y7-JFVU].
85. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS., subch. 3 (2016).
86. Id. subch. 4.
87. Id. § 401(a)(2).
88. See text accompanying supra note 34.
89. SVX Issuer Manual, supra note 43.
90. Id.
91. Impact Exchange Board Listing Guide, supra note 50; see text accompanying supra note 54.
92. Frequently Asked Questions, MISSION MARKETS, supra note 56; see text accompanying
supra note 56.
93. Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K Release No. 33-10064, 18
SEC Docket 113, at 14 (Apr. 13, 2016). (disclosure requirements “can facilitate the coordination of
registrants around consistent disclosure standards, increasing the efficiency with which investors can
process the information.”), https://www.sec.gov/rules/concept/2016/33-10064.pdf [https://perma.cc/
W4BS-C8LU].
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information really matters, as well as how to collect, measure, and report
that information.94 Premature uniform regulation may cut short a valuable
learning process. As will be discussed below,95 one benefit of regulation
through exchanges is that it allows some significant uniformity (across
companies listed on a given exchange) while still allowing for diversity
and learning across exchanges.
Beyond the content of disclosure, important questions remain
concerning the process by which disclosure is created. Most importantly,
should third-party auditing and certification be required? B Lab96 is the
main actor here so far, though there are others. As summarized above,
some of the new exchanges require a third-party certifier, while others do
not. Outside certifiers can obviously increase the reliability of the content
in the disclosure. However, they increase compliance costs. Also, insofar
as the issuers pay for certification, the problems that traditional ratings
agencies have faced in recent years suggest challenges that could become
an issue for social enterprise rating agencies should their ratings come to
have significant value in public markets.97 Thus, who watches the watchers
is a serious question. This is another area where exchanges could play a
useful role. Is there a need for new government regulation, either of
individual benefit corporation reporting, of third-party certifiers, or of
exchanges focused on social enterprises? At this stage, given how new and
evolving the field is, new specific regulation seems premature. After all,
public companies will be subject to traditional securities fraud rules. But
should public social enterprises and possibly exchanges for them become
much more widespread, the SEC will presumably want to study how those
entities are handling disclosure.
In this era of online offerings and trading, one form of airing
information that may deserve more exploration is social media. People
today are quite used to using sites like Yelp and TripAdvisor to rate
businesses. This could be a very useful way of airing information about
the performance of public social enterprises. Of course, such online sites
are also clear targets for securities fraud. This is another area where
exchanges could play a role in creating and policing bulletin boards about

94. See generally Alnoor Ebrahim & V. Kasturi Rangan, What Impact? A Framework for
Measuring the Scale and Scope of Social Performance, 56 CAL. MGMT. REV. 118 (2014),
http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/CMR5603_07_Ebrahim_e3316477-8965-4287be95-04642982b638.pdf [https://perma.cc/MGA4-S4JQ].
95. Mahoney, infra note 134 and accompanying text.
96. B LAB, https://www.bcorporation.net/ [https://perma.cc/5BRQ-2M3P].
97. See generally Aline Darbellay & Frank Partnoy, Credit Rating Agencies Under the DoddFrank Act, 30 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP. 1 (Dec. 2011); Claire A. Hill, Limits of DoddFrank Rating Agency Reform, 15 CHAP. L. REV. 133 (2011).
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listed companies (and if that happens, it is another area I am sure that the
SEC will want to monitor).
Another traditional corporate governance mechanism is fiduciary
98
duty. The directors and officers of a corporation have a duty to make
decisions that they reasonably believe are in the best interests of the
corporation. Of course, what counts as the best interests of a corporation
is a long-standing debate.99 The central legal innovation of benefit
corporations is the statutory formulation of fiduciary duties to explicitly
require that directors and officers consider not just the financial interests
of shareholders, but also the interests of a wide range of corporate
stakeholders, typically including employees, creditors, customers, the
community, and the environment.100 However, many commentators fear
that the statutes build in so many limits to potential lawsuits for violation
of these duties that the new duties are basically toothless.101 There is a
tough balancing act—making the duties too strong and easily enforceable
risks scaring off anyone from founding benefit corporations because any
decision risks hurting some set of stakeholders.102
The early experiments in public exchanges discussed above do little
or nothing to explicitly address fiduciary duty. As far as duties are
concerned, legally publicly traded benefit corporations are no different
from those that are closely held. However, there is a practical effect of
going public that could be crucial: public companies have many more
shareholders and thus, many more potential plaintiffs in a fiduciary duty
lawsuit.103 Moreover, public companies will generally lose control over
whom owns their shares. If they underperform financially, they may find
activist shareholders buying up shares in order to try to force the board to
take actions that raise the share price.104 These actions may be in conflict
with a company’s social mission. Thus, the expansion of the shareholder
base that comes with going public may make the duty lawsuit a stronger
accountability device but may also create more pressure to move away
98. See generally Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Fiduciary Duties: The Emerging
Jurisprudence, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 133 (Claire A.
Hill & Brett H. McDonnell eds., 2012).
99. See generally Ian B. Lee, The Role of the Public Interest in Corporate Law, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 106 (Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell eds.,
2012).
100. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS., subch. 3 (2016).
101. McDonnell, supra note 4, at 62–65.
102. Id., at 65–70.
103. Joan MacLeod Heminway, Corporate Purpose and Litigation Risk in Publicly Held U.S.
Benefit Corporations, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 611, 625–26 (2017). Note, however, that the model
legislation limits standing to bring a suit to holders collectively of at least 2% of the outstanding shares.
MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 305(c)(2)(i) (2016).
104. Coffee & Palia, supra note 30, at 553.
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from social mission. Counterbalancing this: under the benefit corporation
duty rules, shareholders themselves may sue if they think the company has
drifted away from its social mission.105 Thus, directors and officers face
possible lawsuits for overemphasizing either side of their dual mission,
and with more shareholders, whose composition they may not be able to
control, their exposure to such lawsuits may be a concern.
Rules and practices concerning board representation (or
representation at other levels of decision-making) are another potential
governance mechanism. For traditional public corporations, the move to
requiring independent directors for various board committees and boards
overall has been a leading governance development in recent decades.106
The Model Benefit Corporation Act provides for the possibility of
appointing benefit directors, who would be responsible for specifically
focusing on how a company is pursuing and achieving its social mission.107
The exchanges discussed in Part II do not appear to have focused much on
this type of mechanism. One exception to that statement is the IX
requirement that listed companies must commit to “ongoing monitoring
and evaluation of impact performance using clearly defined impact
indicators for performance assessment and reporting.”108
More could be done with board representation. One could have
constituency directors actually elected by the members of stakeholder
groups other than shareholders. In some countries, most notably Germany,
co-determination via employee representatives on boards is an important
instance of that strategy.109 Germany also illustrates another possible
mechanism: a two-tier board structure.110 The management board is
composed of insiders, but the supervisory boards of public companies are
composed of representatives elected by shareholders and employees. The
supervisory board structure, focused on monitoring and setting broad

105. The model benefit corporation statutes appear to forestall damages for violations of the duty
to consider nonshareholder interests, limiting the pressure of potential suits from that direction.
However, I have argued elsewhere that those appearances may be deceiving—it is far from clear to
me that the model statute forecloses damages where a plaintiff successfully argues that managers have
failed to consider other stakeholder interests. See McDonnell, supra note 4, at 41–42.
106. See generally Lisa M. Fairfax, The Elusive Quest for Director Independence, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 170 (Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell eds.,
2012).
107. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 302 (2016).
108. Impact Exchange Board Listing Guide, supra note 50, at 10.
109. Brett H. McDonnell, Employee Primacy, or Economics Meets Civic Republicanism at
Work, 13 STAN J.L. BUS. & FIN. 334, 379–80 (2008).
110. See generally Klaus J. Hopt, The German Law of and Experience with the Supervisory
Board (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 305, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2722702.
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strategy rather than more detailed decision-making, may be an appropriate
place to focus on representing the interests of various stakeholders.111
Below the full board level, stakeholders could be represented on
committees of various kinds. These could be board or sub-board level
committees.112 The committees could focus on various topics, with
different stakeholder groups represented on different committees
depending upon the nature of their interests. Committees could be merely
advisory or could have more significant decision-making authority. There
are many variants possible, depending upon which stakeholder interests
one would like to see represented, and who might have the authority to
appoint representatives of those interests. To date, exploration of
representative strategies to advance stakeholder interests has been an
underexplored mechanism in the social enterprise movement.
These representation mechanisms focus on ways in which
nonshareholder constituencies might be given an indirect voice in
decision-making. Another set of mechanisms concerns voting by
shareholders, for which the standard is one share/one vote.113 NYSE and
Nasdaq rules114 limit the ability of listed companies to deviate from one
share/one vote after they have gone public, but allow deviations from this
rule at the time of going public.115 The main example of such a deviation
is dual-class shares. With dual-class shares, one class of shares has more
voting power than another class. Depending upon the numbers, this can
allow a small group of shareholders to retain voting control over the board
even though others hold a majority of the financial interest in the company.
As noted above, Laureate Education, looking to become the first publicly
traded benefit corporation, has dual-class shares. Leading media and high
tech companies also use this structure.
As noted above,116 dual-class shares are highly controversial. The
conventional wisdom among corporate law scholars and economists is that
the structure creates rotten incentives.117 Those with control of the
company do not have a corresponding financial stake in the company, and
may thus be tempted to make decisions that help them while hurting the
share value. On the other hand, dual-class shares may be a way of
111. COLIN MAYER, FIRM COMMITMENT: WHY THE CORPORATION IS FAILING US AND HOW TO
RESTORE TRUST IN IT 267–68 (2013).
112. McDonnell, supra note 109, at 380–81.
113. See text accompanying supra note 63.
114. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 313.00 (2013),
http://nysemanual.nyse.com;
NASDAQ STOCK MARKET RULES, R. 5640 (2006),
http://nasdaq.cchwallstreet.com/NASDAQ/.
115. See id.
116. Supra note 63 and accompanying text.
117. Christopher C. McKinnon, Dual-Class Capital Structures: A Legal, Theoretical, &
Empirical Buy-Side Analysis, 5 MICH. BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 81, 87–88 (2016).
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protecting against the pressures of mission drift that can come with public
share ownership. If one seeks financial investment by public shareholders
but fears that those shareholders, or their successor purchasers, will seek
high share values at the expense of social mission, dual-class shares are a
way of bringing those shareholders on board while limiting their influence.
These competing effects illustrate the competing considerations facing
publicly traded social enterprises.
Other shareholder voting mechanisms are also possible. One
mechanism that has received some attention is time-phased or tenure
voting.118 With this system, shareholders receive more per-share voting
rights the longer they hold their shares. This is meant to reduce the
pressures to overemphasize short-term profits. A short-term focus may
hurt nonshareholder constituents insofar as keeping groups such as
employees and customers happy may result in better long-term
performance. It is debated whether short-termism is really a problem in
current American public companies, but I have argued elsewhere that it
could well be.119 There is limited experience to date with tenure voting and
the empirical evidence surrounding it is uncertain (as empirical evidence
so often is). However, the theoretical and empirical arguments in favor of
tenure voting are real enough that they at least suggest that further
experimentation should be allowed.120
A related but different proposal comes from Colin Mayer.121 Under
his proposal, shareholders would register their shares for a set period of
years. The voting power of the shares would decrease with the time
remaining for their registration. Unlike tenure voting, instead of rewarding
past long-term holding, this system would directly tie voting power to the
length of time the shareholders are committed to ownership.
Another possible shareholder-focused mechanism is shareholder
screening. In closely held companies, the founders and early investors are
generally able to control who the shareholders are: by careful selection of
initial investors, by the lack of a market for shares, and by contractual
mechanisms such as rights of first refusal. Going public generally entails
the loss of that control. Might there yet be ways to screen out investors
with inappropriate goals, especially those with an inadequate commitment
to a company’s social mission? Dadush emphasizes this question, and is
generally critical of the exchanges she examines for their lack of any such

118. See generally Lynne L. Dallas & Jordan M. Barry, Long-Term Shareholders and
Time-Phased Voting, 40 DEL. J. CORP. L. 541 (2016).
119. See generally Hill & McDonnell, supra note 31.
120. Dallas & Barry, supra note 118, at 645–46.
121. MAYER, supra note 111, at 264–67.
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screening device.122 She approvingly points to the SVX for its clear
warnings to investors that listed companies may have lower financial
returns than more traditional businesses.123 Might there be other ways of
screening beyond warnings and clear disclosure of the dual mission nature
of benefit corporations? For more quasi-public type markets, exchanges or
portals may retain some control over who is allowed to trade on the
exchange. Investors who demonstrate a lack of commitment to the goals
of the exchange could be excluded, as suggested in the rules of the SVX.124
However, how one would determine when such a remedy is appropriate
seems rather murky.
A final type of governance device relies on gatekeepers.125 Corporate
gatekeepers are outside professionals who help monitor the behavior of
corporate managers and certify to investors and others that their behavior
is appropriate. Gatekeepers include ratings agencies, auditors, insurers,
lawyers, investment banks, and stock exchanges, among others. For
traditional for-profit companies, the governance role of gatekeepers has
received increased attention in recent years.126 As with all governance
mechanisms considered here, the gatekeeping role can be adapted to the
needs of social enterprises, and that adaptation is already happening.
B Lab is the most obvious and important gatekeeper in the benefit
corporation field so far.127 B Lab plays a central role in both creating
disclosure standards and also in certifying how well specific companies
satisfy those standards. Several of the new exchanges rely upon disclosure
rules generated by others, like the GIIRS.128 Crucial to the success of
benefit corporations is convincing interested investors, as well as
employees and customers, that the companies are credibly committed to
their dual missions.129 Certifiers like B Lab help create credibility,
although as noted above, the issuer pays model could threaten that
credibility, as has happened with the ratings agencies’ scandals of recent
years.
Corporate lawyers are another potential set of gatekeepers. Law
firms may play a leading role in helping bring more reputable companies
public, and investors could look to the involvement of such companies for
122. Dadush, supra note 34, at 222–26.
123. Id. at 223.
124. Id. at 206.
125. See generally JOHN C. COFFEE JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE (2006).
126. See id.
127. See Brett McDonnell, Benefit Corporations and Strategic Action Fields or (The Existential
Failing of Delaware), 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 263, 281 (2016).
128. See supra notes 43 and 57 and accompanying text.
129. Joseph W. Yockey, Does Social Enterprise Law Matter?, 66 ALA. L. REV. 767, 799–800
(2015).
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assurance.130 Such firms also play a major role in guiding companies and
in spreading best practices concerning good corporate governance. Might
law firms arise specializing in benefit corporations? If so, they could play
a significant role in helping encourage more such companies and more
widespread investment in them.131
Another related set of corporate gatekeepers consists of investment
banks, broker-dealers, and the sponsors of investment funds. These
securities firms are financial intermediaries that gather information about
potential prospects for investment and then help inform would-be
investors about attractive target investments. Some securities firms now
offer funds or other products that focus on social enterprises. The Impact
Bonds mentioned above that are sold on IX are an example.132 MX also
offers managed funds.133 There are plenty of other examples.
Finally, stock exchanges are themselves important gatekeepers, as
are similar institutions, such as portals for crowdfunding. Because these
are the main focus of this Article, Part IV looks more closely at the role
that they can play in light of the existing experiments discussed in Part II
and the various governance mechanisms discussed in this Part III.
IV. THE ROLES OF EXCHANGES
As we explore what sorts of practices and institutions may help
publicly traded benefit corporations thrive, exchanges present a useful
intermediate level of institution. As compared with legal regulatory
reforms, certainly at the level of federal securities law and to a lesser extent
also at the level of state business association law, exchanges provide an
opportunity for experimentation and diversity. Experimentation is
important because it is still early in the development of social enterprises,
and we do not have a good sense as to what sorts of governance practices
are likely to work. As to diversity, the concept of “social enterprise” covers
a wide range of types of enterprises. Practices that work well for some
businesses within that range may not work as well for others. If a range of
exchanges or similar market places for public social enterprises develops,
different exchanges can provide an infrastructure for different kinds of
enterprises.134

130. Richard W. Painter, Transactions Cost Engineers, Loophole Engineers, or Gatekeepers:
The Role of Business Lawyers After the Financial Meltdown, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE
ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 255, 263–70 (Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell eds., 2012).
131. McDonnell, supra note 127, at 286.
132. See supra note 49.
133. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 56.
134. For extended arguments in favor of stock exchanges as primary regulators, see generally
Paul G. Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453 (1997).
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Much experimentation can, and will, of course, occur at the level of
individual businesses. However, to succeed, especially at the level of
larger, publicly traded entities, businesses must attract and retain investors,
creditors, employees, customers, and other stakeholders. They need to
coordinate the expectations of those various groups, credibly conveying
information about how they are pursuing their dual missions while
developing practices and routines for effectively balancing sometimes
competing aims.135 Gatekeepers of the sort discussed at the end of Part
III136 may help in this emerging coordination of expectations, and
exchanges could be an effective locus for some of this coordination. Let
us consider how that might develop for the various governance
mechanisms discussed in Part III.
Disclosure will be a major concern of exchanges focused on benefit
corporations, or social enterprises more broadly. Although disclosure by
public companies is now heavily regulated under federal securities law,
much of the early development of that disclosure occurred within the
exchanges.137 Publicly traded benefit corporations will, of course, be
subject to the securities rules that govern all public companies, but for the
specific concerns of disclosure related to social enterprise status,
regulation through exchanges, rather than through the law, presently
appears more attractive. As noted above, exchanges face a variety of
questions about disclosure. How detailed and quantitative should they
require disclosure to be, and should they require certification by outside
companies like B Lab? If exchanges do choose to require specific and
quantitative disclosure, should they write their own rules or require
compliance with standards devised by other organizations, and if the latter,
should they settle on one set of standards or allow listed companies to
choose from a range of options? There are some tough tradeoffs and those
tradeoffs may change over time. For instance, prematurely settling on just
one detailed standard may cut off useful experimentation and learning. On
the other hand, as we come to get a better sense of what disclosure is
useful, early diversity may be pared down as investors look for more
uniform disclosure so that they can more easily compare companies.
Looking at other governance mechanisms, exchanges seem unlikely
to play much of a role in the development of fiduciary duty rules.
However, they could play a significant role in shaping rules surrounding
board representation and shareholder voting. After all, traditional
exchanges have played a major role in shaping such rules for traditional

135. Yockey, supra note 129.
136. Supra notes 125–133 and accompanying text.
137. Mahoney, supra note 134, at 1466–69.
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companies.138 Should exchanges for social enterprise require or encourage
some form of representation or voting by nonshareholder constituencies?
Should they allow, or even encourage, deviations from the one share/one
vote rule for shareholders? Online bulletin boards for investors are one
mechanism that exchanges (and similar institutions, such as portals for
crowdfunding and other sorts of online investing) may be particularly
well-placed to foster and regulate. As noted above, younger investors in
particular are quite familiar with these sorts of online sites in other
contexts, and they could prove a highly valuable governance device for
publicly traded enterprises. They could also prove a locus for securities
fraud. Striking a balance between allowing such sites to achieve their
potential for good while limiting their potential for harm will be
challenging. Exchanges and similar institutions should get a first shot at
attempting such regulation, although the SEC is unlikely to allow them to
do so without oversight.
Finally, exchanges may serve as a locus for coordinating the
involvement of the other gatekeepers discussed above. The exchanges, in
creating and modifying their corporate governance listing rules, will both
draw upon and help shape practices developed by other gatekeepers. We
have just discussed how this can work in setting disclosure rules and Part
II discussed how new exchanges have drawn upon the rules of standard
setters like GIIRS and B Lab.139
Lawyers will play a major role in advising and drafting rules for
representation and voting, as well as disclosure, and will also play a role
in helping choose and manage relationships with exchanges. Thus, if one
or a few exchanges come to play a major role in listing publicly traded
benefit corporations (or other kinds of social enterprises), corporate
lawyers working with such companies will both pay attention to and help
disseminate the rules and practices of those exchanges, while also helping
to shape them.
Investment banks, broker-dealers, and the promoters of social
enterprise stock and bond funds are other potentially significant
gatekeepers as discussed above. These securities firms and professionals
will frequently work with and through exchanges if they are available and
well-used. Some of the new social enterprise exchanges are already
creating space for stock and bond funds.140 Indeed, even some traditional
exchanges are working to create spaces for socially responsible
companies, e.g., with sustainability indices.

138. Fairfax, supra note 106, at 138.
139. Supra notes 43 and 56 and accompanying text.
140. Supra notes 49 and 56 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
Social enterprise is a new concept, and benefit corporations are an
even newer attempt to provide a legal instrument for carrying out social
enterprises. So far, there are not many benefit corporations and almost all
of them are small, closely held businesses. This particular social
experiment may never go much further than this. However, the concept of
benefit corporations may become widely adopted. If so, we may face a
time when a number of benefit corporations are or want to become
publicly traded.
Publicly traded benefit corporations will face some unique corporate
governance questions, related to but distinct from the questions that face
both closely held benefit corporations and publicly traded traditional
corporations. Addressing those questions will require new variations on
corporate governance mechanisms. Many new practices will need to be
developed, requiring the input of many different kinds of institutions.
Stock exchanges, or similar trading platforms for widely held
corporations, could play a significant role in these developments. Some
experiments have already begun that begin to suggest what such
exchanges might look like. We surveyed some of those developments in
Part II. Part III looked more closely at some of the main categories of
corporate governance mechanisms: disclosure, duty, representation,
voting, and gatekeepers. Would-be promoters of future exchanges aimed
at benefit corporations would do well to consider the kind of roles and
supporting guidance such exchanges might provide to help shape those
governance mechanisms.

